This article is within the "Too Big To Fail 2 In Europe" series.
Why now? Because the impact of the COVID crisis, the dual green-digital transition, and two armed conflicts within the European Union neighborhood are having an impact on decision-making within the European Union.
The key risk? That the stacking up of "high priority" could generate not an increased focus, but a dispersion of limited resources- and a continuous stop-and-go and reshaping of direction (as we have already seen in Europe since 2020), which would further increase dispersion of resources, and further reduce the impact generated by the allocation of resources.
It is not just a matter of economy- it is also a matter of political priorities and accountability, which, in the multi-layer decision-making patterns of the European Union (e.g. we have not one, but three presidents), usually imply that are slow.
Anyway, being structured to be multi-layer, as will discuss in this article, when you remove from the picture a layer or two to accelerate, checks and balances go down the train: and it becomes yet another fix to apply, i.e. tinkering upon tinkering.
The previous two were in:
_ June: Too Big To Fail 2 In Europe: 1- introduction and the industry of industries #automotive.
_ July: Too Big To Fail 2 In Europe: 2- #data-based society and diffused resilience #European #Union
In August, instead, was focused on the series "From the past, the future".
You can find both within the "Rethinking organizations" section of this website.
In this third article of "Too Big To Fail 2 In Europe", will focus on another element that is closely related to the previous one (data-based society) and the founding elements of the European Union.
This article is also a first step toward adopting a new format- I will see how it gets, and will eventually share results from the experiment in another article within the "Books in progress" series.
The table of contents:
_ preamble- introducing the themes discussed
_ democracy: a Western knowledge-based perspective
_ history: how did we get where we are now
_ democracy at work in crisis management
_ democracy at war: pre-empt or repair
_ keeping the balance between components
_ conclusions and next steps
Preamble- introducing the themes discussed
This article on democracy should have had a title inspired by "Saving the Private Ryan" movie, akin to "Saving democracy within the European Union from its own autodafé".
Anyway, the title was too blunt, so decided instead to keep the title that you see: less controversial- the controversy will be within the following sections.
As I keep repeating, and did also earlier this week in Turin both in writing in Italian and speaking in English and Italian when asked, I did not work in just a single industry.
My expertise is being cross-industry and working with experts of different disciplines to achieve a result (more often than not, recover and complete something).
Actually, as a former colleague said to me and others decades ago, in the early 1990s ended up inventing my own work, which was probably a good description.
Blended my past interests in human societies (archaeology, history, cultural anthropology), sciences (from physics to understanding the human brain- which came before giving a try to an "electronic brain", in the late 1970s, on punched cards in Fortran IV), political science (starting with Constitutions, and then in the early 1980s getting into European integration advocacy), to business change and business number crunching to support decision-making.
Before starting the discussion, will share a bit of consideration and data about our Western democracies within the first theme.
Yes, will share a bit of my perspective and that "blend" I wrote about, but also why we need to change our approach.
Change does not happen in a vacuum, hence, within the second theme will describe as, right after WWII, Europe started getting together countries that for centuries had been at each other throat.
The path we followed from WWII to the latest treaties (including the 2021 "Quirinale Treaty" between France and Italy, including the 2019 Aachen Treaty "encore" on the 1963 "Elysée Treaty" between France and Germany) contains actually the seeds of our current state within the European Union.
The third theme starts from those shared foundations to move onto how our unique blend of technocratic democracy copes with crises.
Routinely European Union decision-making is lambasted for its too many decision points, and routinely since decades we took shortcuts (you can read a few articles that published in the past), which could be summarized with: if you cannot convince all those needed, jump forward- nobody will dare to contradict and will eventually have a shared interest into forming a consensus.
Which, over the last few years, assumed the curious element of nobody voicing that much dissent e.g. about the "green transition", an initiative that forgot to consider workforce impacts and transition timing (as I wrote also in previous articles about automotive).
Then, suddenly, when to confirm the European Commission was needed a switch of political majority, everybody started to pile up against the green transition.
Including the former President of the European Central Bank and former President of the Italian Council of Minister Mario Draghi:
If only all those critics had expressed the same concerns with the same level of conviction that we see now often on media (courtesy also of digital media picking up on something and re-spinning for a couple of weeks on a daily basis), probably we would not have that half-baked green transition, whose effects have not yet been fully deployed, but are used as an excuse to scare politicians across the European Union clamoring for funding to sustain companies that blatantly missed trends (not just the green transition- also customer's demand and demographic/consumption trends).
The fourth theme is about wars and democracy.
Anyway, wars are usually said to be the device of weak politicians to stay in power, but we should consider "wars" as a concept, not just in military terms.
The European Union had many "war-like" economic turns: from COVID in 2020, to altering (as a result) supply chains and launching various initiatives (from altering energy sources, to bringing back electronic chip production in Europe, to propping up the European defense industry), to various diplomatic initiatives, to weapons provisioning to Ukraine, to a string of sanctions rounds against Russia and, at last, a bit of noises after ignoring for months the de facto demise of the potential of a two-states solution not just in Gaza, but also in Cisgiordania.
The concept in the title of that section ("pre-empt or repair") will be explained within the section itself: but, if you read often my articles, probably you have already more than an idea.
As I wrote at the beginning of this preamble, talking about democracy in Europe as a pillar of the European Union could benefit from the "parable" of "Saving Private Ryan" movie (lost three brothers in the war, so the mission is to save the fourth) should help to consider the guidelines for the roadmap to overcome our current predicament.
So, the fifth theme, after the previous three showing how we got were we are, how that history resulted in how the European Union took on crises, and how adopting a "war footing" mindset across the board all concurred to affected the democratic side of the European Union (not just its Member States, but also how we citizens evolved/declined our concept of democracy), shifts toward scenarios for improvement- my five cents.
Within the conclusions and next steps will just share a summary of key points, and my next research and publication steps.
Democracy: a Western knowledge-based perspective
SUMMARY:
_ why no organization can have 100% of the knowledge it needs
_ democracy: strengths, weaknesses, and sampling concepts
_ a bit of voting turnout history in Western democracies
_ political vs. technocratic concepts of "four freedoms"
Will start with an apparent detour, whose purpose is to share some key concepts that will "seed" the other sections of this article.
Technology for me is not just about devices, mechanical electronic or virtual, it is any form of "structured knowledge"- with its rituals, codified lingo, and internal hierarchies.
My role in all this? By chance and by design, to act as a bridge- and this is where my expertise lies.
As I said again on Tuesday evening, a bridge between business, IT/experts, and vendors.
So, I ended up negotiating and auditing contracts or activities in English French Italian, both new contracts or renegotiating existing ones, or working on missions in different domains, learning a bit (and then, ex-post, digging to learn a bit more).
And also, as somebody saw in my "one line per project" CV that realized just once upon request from an American company in Russia circa 2009, I had also been called repeatedly to carry our the feasibility study (not just technical- also business and impacts) on a variety of themes.
A nice learning journey that will never end- and that, each time, implied attaching to expert sources or flesh-and-bones experts: and if there is something I am good at, is listening and picking up signals before talking, when needed.
Maybe will update that detailed 2009 document up to the latest projects- both those for customers and for my own, since 2009- better, will create a small query engine answering questions.
Because, let's be frank, in our times no single organization, private or public or political, can expect to be able to have 100% of the "structured knowledge" needed within its own walls.
And, as already explained in 2003-2005 within my e-zine on change BusinessFitnessMagazine, and then also in #synspec a decade later, also if you had at some point that 100%, there is limited chance that you could keep it in prime shape for a long time (see those two references for more details on this concept).
And, actually, that is where the difference between perception and reality in change matters: assuming to have had at some time that 100% implies that you will assume that you can retain that- and, when faced with a need to change, that assumption would become a formidable element of your own structural resistance to change, because...
... will be provided by "experts"- your own, nonetheless.
Our society in the XXI century will gradually extend its "components" (e.g. technology, but also social expectations) worldwide- courtesy of instantaneous, unmediated communication.
We still consider democracy as a nation-by-nation thing, and frankly those that tried to export democracy ended up picking up the wrong partners for that enterprise.
Democracy has to be develop from inside, not bestowed from outside, if you want to keep it alive.
Which implies that expertise will not be in a single location or country, but could shift, evolve, connect worldwide- with a significant impact also on how our democracies will work and interact.
Meaning: we will have to get used to continuously evolving risk profiles- and risk assessment (and risk-taking, and risk-appetite) will imply that our society, as an aggregate, will have to "cocoon" those unable to cope with this dynamics, not let them lead.
Otherwise, the risk is that, as I saw e.g. since I was made to return to my birthplace, Turin, that used to be a company town (see here articles about the cultural impact), your leadership will cocoon itself out of reality.
In this case - until there is a tipping point that cannot be recovered- and you will have lost not just competitive advantage, but also the ability to evolve that.
It is not about being smart, it is about integrating at systemic level, blending, not constantly looking for confirmation of being smart.
In 1994, during a dinner in London with a key founding member of a club I belong to, hosted at the home of a former international director of the same club, I remember that a woman German psychologist for the club said that having Mensa on your CV in Germany was seen as a negative, as Mensa Members were considered risk-averse.
Which seems a contradiction, having a high IQ tested (whatever that means), and then refraining from going outside the beaten path- but is consistent with the human need to get confirmation of status.
Personally, I prefer to be a "bridge" and take risks- hence, the reason why worked across so many domains, industries, and countries, and keep being a bookworm who does experiments.
Moreover, most of what you see on my CV really were missions and roles that received through word-of-mouth via former partners, colleagues, customers, even prospects.
If you want your experiments just to be 100% successes, then you are not doing experiments: you are applying learned lessons.
I prefer, whenever feasible, to apply experiments in controlled environments (e.g. my own projects), before applying "live", to minimize unnecessary risks, or at least know better what is needed to contextualize risk.
In some cases, notably whenever (often, really since mid-1980s) was asked to help recover and complete, you have to be tossed into water and then learn swimming by connecting the dots you already have with what you will pick up along the way.
And adjust, adjust, adjust.
Which is also a key characteristic of democracy: a famous 1992 book from Fukuyama, "The End of History and the Last Man" (more people commented it than read it- but it is something that with social media we got used to) reminded that it can adjust itself- hence, end of history as progression, as democracy was able to pre-empt and repair itself.
After few democracies also between the late 1990s and early XXI century did convert into something else, and did as in the 1920s and 1930s in Europe, he adjusted a bit the tune- but I think that the original message was fine- albeit I think that liberal democracy is the not best variant, if we are looking for continuous improvement (maybe will write more in the future).
In business as elsewhere I am an advocate of continuous improvement, and dislike courtesans and courtiers (somebody might remember an article I published while living in Brussels about the "Jago principle", from Shakespeare's "Othello"- those "advisors" that derail their leaders by giving loaded advice), as they are a formidable built-in resistance to change generator (unless they are 100% confident that change will improve their own personal position).
Despite all its imperfections, I like often to quote what Churchill said: "Many forms of Government have been tried, and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed it has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time." (from the International Churchill Society website).
As I wrote in past articles, it is curious how many of those who constantly keep reminding everybody that our democracy started in Ancient Greece, forget that, despite all the checks and balances to e.g. integrate those less well-off, still was not the kind of "inclusive" democracy that we would accept today (you can read some previous articles where I added that point).
And also the "Roman Republic" had its own growing pains, when moved from a single town, to a wider territory (even within Italy- but, again, wrote about the "electoral system tinkering" of the Roman Republic in the past- so, Gerrymandering is nothing new).
Some events happen just out of the blue, but changes usually provide signs before they happen: including the crisis of our representative democracies.
Our current concept of democracy is the "one person, one vote"- but also in the USA really it became a (potential) reality only in the 1960s.
Hence, when you look at this chart, consider that well into the XX century the voting percentage meant percentage of those having a right to vote:
Also, while in some countries being a citizen is enough to have a right to vote, in many other countries (USA included), you have to register (hence, along with Gerrymandering, the continuous discussions about how single USA States brought about methods to actually undermine that registration).
While I am at that: my personal preference is for automatic registration for any citizen in any election, and automatic registration for administrative/local/regional elections for any resident taxpayer, including non-citizens.
And, personally, while resident in Belgium, as I walked the talk almost two decades ago- by registering to vote for local elections, and then selecting to vote a political party that was cross-community, in a country where political parties (and even other institutions) are divided by language and even sometimes religion and political affiliation.
Another interesting source is a report on the voting turnout in Western Europe 1945-2003.
As an Italian citizen, the first campaign that I saw actively from background was as a kid, in 1972, and the first one where I was active again on the background activities (not just as a voter, but also e.g. helping prepare letters to voters etc) was in 1983, when I turned 18.
Between 1948 and 2022 Italy had 19 (!) national elections (supposedly should have been every five years), and we went from a 1948 92.19% voter turnout, to a 2022 63.91%.
As you can see from the picture (from this Wikipedia page), we also switched electoral law once in a while.
If you are curious, will share in the future another dataset on my Kaggle profile- for now, for this article, released only a smaller dataset about mobilization in WWII that will discuss in another section.
Well after WWII, European political leaders mocked the American (meaning: USA) political system, and post-WWII routinely we Europeans pointed at how few bothered to vote, while, and not just in countries were voting was a legal duties with penalties for non-voters, in Western Europe during most of the Cold War our the share of the voters bothering to get to the polls was higher than in the USA.
Initially we Europeans laughed at the theatrics of USA political campaigns, and obsession about polls (e.g. in the 1990s- read Primary Colors, a funny book following the first presidential campaign of then-governor Clinton), and of course at the power of lobbying in the USA (e.g. see the book "The Best Democracy Money Can Buy"), but then we jumped on board- with gusto.
Democracy is a muscle exercise: if you do not use it, it will wither away.
You will still have memories of the prior capabilities, but try to use them, and you will get hurt.
The European Union as we know it prides itself of the "four freedoms" it bestows to itself, its companies, and its citizens:
_ Free movement of goods
_ Free movement of capital
_ Freedom to establish and provide services
_ Free movement of labour.
Personally, as I wrote in the past (e.g. in 2021: Systemic boundaries and the fifth freedom #Italy #EU #NextGenerationEU #PNRR), I prefer the "four freedoms" within a famous 1941 speech delivered by President Roosevelt:
_ Freedom of speech and expression
_ Freedom of worship
_ Freedom from want
_ Freedom from fear.
I think that those European four freedoms are technocratic, and, as I wrote in a 2021 article, "routinely, Member States focus on finance and goods, while still adding what in other domains are called "non-tariff barriers", i.e bureaucratic hurdles.".
Aligning with what I wrote in the previous article in this series, back in that 2021 article referenced a "fifth freedom" that befits a data-centric society, as the EU 27 was there described as an experiment: "a fifth freedom: transparency delivered not as a principle, but as a [collaborative] tool".
Now, before discussing that point across a couple of sections, a small digression about history.
History: how did we get where we are now
SUMMARY:
_ prior articles about Europe and democracy
_ how the European Union institutions evolved
_ the original sin: the democracy of "we know better"
_ reforming vs. tinkering: the way forward for the EU
Already shared within the article series #EP2024 and in other articles some commentary about European Union and democracy (over 60 articles so far), but in this article will follow the concept of this "Too Big To Fail 2 In Europe" series: i.e. building blocks that we should try to save.
Despite all the rhetoric, unfortunately the EU is not by the citizen and for the citizen (to echo in disguise another Constitution): since its inception, suffered of what has been called "democratic deficit", that was partially reduced when in June 1979 there was the first direct election of the European Parliament.
The event was described by the History of European Union section of the europa.eu website as "European citizens directly elect the members of the European Parliament for the first time. Previously members were delegated by national parliaments. Members sit in pan-European political groups, not in national delegations."
Anyway, the European Union is really, since its inception, business disguised as politics- or the politics of business: look at the founding element, the European Communities on specific commodities (the European Coal and Steel Community, 1951, which was preceded in 1949 by first NATO and then the Council of Europe).
Also, look at how often, despite having multinationals that e.g. are registered in Netherlands but operate and invest across Europe (including in non-EU countries), whenever there is a crisis or a discussion suddenly the critical point seems to be another bit of technocratic integration that would transfer decision points in Brussels.
It took few years (1957, Treaties of Rome), before the European Economic Community and European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) were established, effective 1958.
As you can see from the names: again, business before politics.
The idea that you can spread democracy by generating structural incentives to economic cooperation is something that we got used to see often since the demise of the Soviet Union.
Consequences include delegating decision points to technocratic aggregates that, eventually, as the European Commission increasingly got us used (e.g. see the articles within the #EP2024 series for more details) since few years, answer only to themselves.
Because it is embedded within the "jumping forward" approach that routinely has been used in Europe to bypass lengthy negotiations: what is always presented as a reference to Jean Monnet, but frankly has been used to justify both positive integration and technocratic integration so often, that justifies a sense of disaffection (see previous articles where discussed it in various contexts).
There have been routinely attempts to evolve through a deeper consideration of impacts (e.g. the reforms jointly proposed in 2023 by France and Germany), but reform take time- as you need to generate consensus.
Even if the European Union were to shift toward a simple majority whenever voting for reforms, still would not be enough to have just two Member States out of 27 to be in agreement on how the future shape of the European Union should be.
Already the European Union had the issue of new Member States from the former COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, what we in Western Europe nicknamed "satellite countries" within the Cold War Soviet Bloc) that often seemed to look more to Washington than to Brussels, and even to form their own "bloc" through the Vizegrad Four (Czech Republic, hungary, Poland, and Slovakia).
The Baltics routinely, even before the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, were actually louder in clamoring for "containment" of Russia- to the curious point of highlighting the percentage that they invested in defense, while actually having to rely on other NATO Member States to complement their tiny forces.
Something that, overall, routinely reminded me a book presentation from a diplomat from United Kingdom whose content echoes a famous episode of "Yes, Minister" (specifically, the one where his Permanent Secretary explains why United Kingdom belatedly joined the European Communities): divide et impera.
On top of all this, the European Commission, notably under the two-terms of the incumbent President of the European Commission, became a continuous source of "structural tinkering", but adopting a concept that seems more communication than reforms.
Reforms take time, piling up announces of initiatives is faster: notably when the implementation time is at least apparently overlooked.
The "Monnet approach", as wrote in previous articles, shifted from being a tool used by a kind of "coalition of the willing" within the European Union to push for further integration on specific issues (see e.g. this short discussion), generating as a side-effect political integration, to a tool directly used by the European Commission to push an agenda that, in the latest incarnation, seems to be more personal than technocratic.
Witness the flip-flopping on green transition that happened not before the 2024 European Parliament elections, and not even after the election, but after the confirmation of the President of the European Commission, to obtain the confirmation of the Commission Members.
Anyway, the purpose of this section was to introduce, through the history of how the initial post-WWII initiatives evolved into the European Union, concepts and critical issues that will be discussed in other sections.
And now, two themes: one about democracy and crises, and democracy and war.
Democracy at work in crisis management
SUMMARY:
_ democracy at work: utopias and practice
_ working democracies in ordinary times
_ shifting toward a posse comitatus mindset
_ leadership in crisis management
I have an online library catalog, on LibraryThing.com, under the nickname "aleph123"- which is the same that used when started publishing online, while living in Brussels, before 2008.
Why a nickname? Because at the time I was working in different industries as management consultant and, as back then was not yet common to have "serious" people post online, did not want to confuse my own business persona with my personal ideas- albeit those working with me (partners, customers, team members) all knew that I am a boring bipartisan with no political party affiliation but on the center-left of the political spectrum.
Anyway, even on LibraryThing I have multiple accounts, but eventually kept this one as my reference one.
As those who saw my Internet traffic logs (I was first told about my traffic in Italy decades ago then in Belgium), from Archive.org downloaded in the past various books about utopias that are way past expiration of copyright- albeit, curiously , still routinely reprinted by publishers by adding pages of commentary with limited value added, but enough to justify a copyright on that specific version.
And, actually, while bored in Brussels, I found interesting exploring around 2009 the courses on political science, history, political philosophy, game theory, and other related subjects (e.g. medical history) that Yale put online on its website oyc.yale.edu
At the same time, as shared in previous articles, since the early 1990s was within various mailing lists in the USA, part of when joined a mailing list on "reinventing the government", registered for related material, received a BPR-CD with documents and software and a "good luck note" for my cultural and organizational change activities from the USA DoD, and was also subscribed to CrossTalk, a magazine on IT with a "systemic view" and cross-domain perspective.
Then, in 1994 and 1995, as part of my pattern to switch industry and get a degree, decided to go back to my late 1970s to early 1980s interest in political science that put me in touch with a European integration advocacy, and attended summer schools on International Political Economy at London School of Economics, and also a summer academy in Sweden on Intercultural Communication and Management- while also, via Mensa, being able to meet other people in London.
Through all those channels, my interest in "organizational culture" that came from prior archaeology and cultural anthropology readings was renewed- and few of the Yale courses actually had as course requirements to read books across 2,000 years of political science history.
Being a bored panda (yes, was a bit overweight), decided that watching the videos would not be enough- I went through the lectures as if I were attending the courses, and read the readings (and also purchased books for courses that were more recent and therefore books were available only for purchase- from game theory, to bioscience).
All those readings allowed to "refresh" my stock of decision-making patterns, something that started from the late 1980s to routinely collect while reading books- no, nothing like "Days of the Condor", but, frankly, reading books and material on "closed communities" (be it tribes, as did as a teenager, or military, churches, etc) is a good training ground to then, in business and society and politics, be able to quickly "spot" emerging or existing formal and informal patterns.
A big help were also some other associations and publications from the USA, from Foreign Affairs, to Rand, to the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and others.
Back in the 1990s to 2010s mainly had to purchase books on paper or download PDF from their websites, but courtesy of COVID I shifted from being invited to workshops and seminars in the USA, to receiving webinar links.
As I wrote above, I should update the catalog on LibraryThing, and also have a large backlog in sharing book reviews (those that I deem to be over 3.5 stars appear also on this website, under the "Selective bibliography" section.
Anyway, if you look at my online catalog, and select on the top left of the pull-down menubar the collection "NextPolitics", it will retrieve (as of 2025-09-25) 970 books that reviewed (including, for some, beside the rating, a review).
The concept is: democracy is embedded in many business patterns that we got used to, e.g. when we shifted from the old "hierarchical" and "command-and-control" or (in project management) "waterfall" to various levels of incremental, iterative, and various flavors of "agile" and lean, we actually introduced elements of participative democracy in our work and social environment.
I shared in past articles references to various authors who are recognized for their works in political science and what I could call "philosophy of social structures": from one of my favorites, "A Theory of Justice" by Rawls, to various books from authors old and more recent (e.g. Kelsen, Schmitt, others).
The point is simple: in the XXI century, we live in complex societies.
Hence, when talking about democracy, we should look also at its implementation- across different domains, and accepting that, the more complex a system is, the more its components needs to have some "intelligence", not to be just "cogs in the wheel".
In 1990, when received my first formal assignment in cultural and organizational change, before later that year being hired by the Italian branch of a French company as senior project manager first, and then to develop a business unit covering also that field, part of my bookworm reaction was to do what I had done while working for my first employer across multiple industries.
So, I started studying more on the business side of culture (from cultural image and identity, to transformation), and in each country I visited ended up coming back with a pile of books- and added more and more books within my collection of "utopias".
An interesting book was "Democracy at work" (you can read a review here), but, as when read that book I had already been first in political advocacy, then in the Army doing also office work and organizing a course, then in business working on development, release management, and then on multiple decision support projects interacting with senior managers, I had a different perspective.
When I write "utopia", many think to the obvious past books (Thomas More "Utopia", and even the older Plato "Republic", or even Hobbes "Leviathan").
Personally, I would suggest a couple of modern examples: Ricardo Semler "Maverick!" and a 1951 movie known as either "Utopia" or "Atoll K", from Laurel and Hardy.
In both cases, the key element is the difference between the narrative that you built, your expectations about the results, and when your narrative meets reality.
I will not comment to either the book or the movie, but will leave you an exercise: think if and when those concepts work- and what would make them work or fail.
This article is within a series on "Too Big To Fail" in Europe- key elements of the European Union structure that should be considered, in the XXI century, founding pillars.
Within the European Union, we do not have really the separation of powers that is considered common in any modern democracy from at least the last few hundred years.
From Tocqueville Foundation website:
"Suppose... a legislative body composed in such a way that it represents the majority without necessarily being enslaved by its passions; an executive branch that possesses a force of its own; and a judiciary that is independent from the other two powers- then you would still have a democratic government, but there would be hardly any risk of tyranny."
Only the limitation, division, and balance of institutional powers can guarantee democracy. These criteria, as Tocqueville sets them out, also provide citizens with concrete tools to evaluate the authenticity of the democracy in which they live.
Working democracies in ordinary times have such a separation of powers, but any democracy will eventually meet that organizational paradox: "quis custodiet ipsos custodes?" (I shared some commentary on that point in few articles in the past).
Lobbying, outright corruption, conflict of interests, political "tunnel view" thinking (assuming that reforms done to support your position will not be used in a negative way be others that could take office)... these are many of the potential issues affecting democracy (but, frankly, also any other political system).
Remember that in the 1920s Italy and 1930s Germany Mussolini and Hitler went into power through elections and use of public opinion, not with a military coup or a revolution.
Once in power, went ahead undermining democracy, one brick in the wall at a time, to remove any possibility of restoring ordinary democracy without a complete upheaval (that they would expect, in their egomaniac obsession, that would be impossible).
There is still the risk, even in ordinary democracies, of a "dictature of majority", but in the XXI century, we are seeing how the same methods of the early 1920s and 1930s could be used by a vocal minority to attempt to force their own agenda through communication, until they turn into a majority (even by simply having majority sit silent).
If in the "Tailor of Panama" the "silent majority" was fiction created to squeeze money out of gullible handlers, in the XXI century any small fringe group can actually use tools as simple as a game within social media to shape up consensus behind a specific agenda- and without necessarily disclosing the agenda, as anything goes for those who think on the line of "Gott mit uns"- left and right.
Look at the polarization in the USA: took decades, but eventually what were marginal positions delivered twice a President representing those positions, and is, as in the 1920s and 1930s in Europe, starting to change the "reference rules".
In the 1920s and 1930s in Europe, the existing structures of liberal democracy with extended suffrage were gradually dismantled and replaced by new structures that were designed to be part of the regime.
In our times, we are observing so far the diversion of existing structures toward different purposes, as the example of using federalization of National Guard in few USA areas.
Anyway, both those in power and the opposition are getting more and more polarized, and are adopting a mindset that is closer to that of "Posse comitatus"- not the USA Posse Comitatus Act, but the original concept.
As if each elected official, in office or in opposition, were entitled to call up their supporters to help control "the enemy".
The political discourse, and not only in the USA, but also e.g. in Italy, is getting closer and closer to that 2001 "Five Steps to Tyranny" documentary (you can find it also on YouTube), wrapped within the 2002 The Century of the Self (ditto).
What are the "five steps to tyranny"?
"us vs them
obey orders
dehumanize opponent
dissenter (stand up) or bystander (stand by)
exterminate.
We saw also in Europe in the 1990s how fast that road can be traveled- but the key difference now is that not only those in power, also those in opposition take often that kind of "we are right therefore we have the right" to impose their own position, losing elections notwithstanding.
And this is one of the issues with our current democracies: we are losing the "agree to disagree" attitude, as, at least in public, political leaders behave as rabble-rousers.
In Italy, we had a long tradition of such figures, and, as figures of speech, we still use their names: Savonarola, Masaniello... whenever there is somebody shaking the tree as if there were a long-term plan for change, while there is none, and react more than act, but raising at each step the volume.
The current crisis of our European democracies (including the Brexit and prior failure in France and Netherlands of the referendum on the European Constitution), and their polarization, is in part due to the a diverging set of expectations.
While post-WWII we were used to a progressive expansion of both structures and rights in Europe, over the last few years communication was more and more technocratic, i.e. more and more focused on minutiae that made sense to insiders, while leaving an open field to communication that tried to reverse track on European integration by leveraging on something more understandable.
I think that the European Union actually has had a "crisis management mode" at least for a couple of decades, since the 2005 referenda: 25 Member States signed, 18 ratified, and two torpedoed.
The Treaty of Lisbon that followed was a paradigm of tinkering: amending the existing, to get as much as possible of the proposed Constitution.
That it was tinkering supreme is proved also by the contents of the proposed Franco-German reforms of 2023, and the discussions that followed.
As I keep repeating often, also earlier this week, in a trench warfare, those with stronger cohesive culture end up unbundling the opponent, capabilities and resources are just components of the mix required to win a war of wills.
I have been asked once in a while why sometimes acquired companies really transform the company that, nominally, is their new owner: and the answer is always "more cohesive culture".
When extremists can leverage on fears or those "five steps to tyranny" to enlarge their consensus, they have maybe a fake, but certainly cohesive set of reference parameters that can be more easily converted into a "logical" and "emotional" discourse, than those instead advocating reforms, nuances, give-and-take.
Over the years, due to lack of resources, leaders went creative, as during the Juncker Commission 2014-2019: from implementing the GDPR, to removing roaming charges for mobile phone use across the European Union (and few other countries), to the European Commission Investment Plan for Europe.
The real field day of crisis management, showing the weakness of the separation of powers within the European Union, happened anyway from 2020, with the COVID crisis, and then ensuing series of crises (that already discussed during the #EP2024 series).
We are still far, far away from the "smart regulations" concept, and the limited powers of the European Parliament were blatantly shown in the recent presentation of the new budget, as described within an article that published in July (Change and communication: few lessons from the new #budget in #Brussels and #politics and #business in #Turin and #Italy).
As I wrote in a previous article in this series: "Smart regulations, in my view, imply also adopting a systemic approach: just because you regulation affects A, does not imply that A operates in a vacuum, and it is just a matter of helicopter money for A, and the hell with the consequences.
Otherwise, you risk having continuous rounds of tinkering- and nobody can plan multi-year investments based on rumors about how regulations will change."
Leadership crisis management should be about the crisis, but also the impacts: making long-term decisions as stop-gap measures is a contradiction in terms.
In system with complex decision-making patterns and organizational structures, even simpler than the European Union, stop-gap measures have to bypass the normal "rationality" or "due process" steps, including critical thinking about consequences, risks, etc.
Without proper separation of powers, what happens is that leadership, as happened within the European Union, can take initiatives that are at best half-baked, or that ignore the complexity of implementation.
Look at the "trade tariffs" management: the European Commission making a long list of promises (from energy provisioning volumes, to technology acquisition, "boots on the ground", etc) that actually mainly either Member States or private companies could implement.
Over the last ten days, there have been various articles reported by media:
_ The new EU narrative of Draghi and von der Leyen: Member States must become adults
_ Draghi calls for pause to AI Act to gauge risks
_ EU falling behind on growth, reforms even more urgent, says Draghi
_ LIVE | Ursula von der Leyen & Mario Draghi Discuss "One Year After the Draghi Report" | APT
_ "Un anno dopo il rapporto Draghi": la conferenza di DRAGHI e VON DER LEYEN su competitività europea
_ The Eu economy is responding: From report to results
_ State of the Union 2025 Address.
My point is: both Mr. Draghi and the President of the Commission seem to have adopted (or retained) an economist or central banker mindset:
_ start thinking, and the market will follow your nudges
_ provide funding, and it all will work
_ reposition to increase competitiveness, and it will happen
_ keep adjusting and will see results.
To quote a book on "Military Intelligence Blunders" by John Hughes-Wilson, this is the intelligence cycle that should be followed:
In crisis management, each one of the steps of that picture has to be considered against at least urgency, risks, capabilities, intent- and tweaked knowing the risks.
If you have plenty of time and resources, you can wait to assess each risk with perfect information to identify the intent of all those involved.
In real life, not just in politics but also in business and society, you have to deal with limited time, resources, information.
Hence, you make choices- but still make choices considering at least knowledge about your own organization (in this case, Member States, their bureaucracies, and economies).
In crisis management, if the crisis depends on your own organization internal issues, that mindset would be workable, as you will have:
_ control of all the resources needed to implement
_ to manage only potential temporary external ripple-effects
e.g. continuity of service for customers.
Anyway, if the crisis has external sources, you have to consider at least few interacting spheres of influence:
_ internal (of course)
_ your supply chain upstream
_ your downstream (regulators, distributors, customers, etc)
_ your competition, existing or potential.
And then consider the timeframe of deployment, impact, and recovery of any intervention.
The continuous flip-flopping on initiatives (start, stop, amend) is fine if you are working just with financial transactions, but when you have cascading effects, and need to prepare to implement, you have to consider additional dimension of complexity.
As an example: if you prepare for years to ensure compliance, and alter your organization, processes, down to the costing of each element in your production Bill of Materials, a few minutes speech hinting that that compliance element is not going to be applied for your competitors, or those based in another country, or at least halted, might have a significant negative impact.
And if you propose changes that require speeding up expenditure (even sidelining the minutiae of where you procure those resources), it is nice as a speech to announce it, but then, as shown by the Recovery and Resilience Facility National Recovery and Resilience Plans implementations, the "logistical" (meaning: people and processes and systems) side needed to convert that into action has to be taken into account.
Our societies are complex, changing course is not just a matter of shifting from left to right or viceversa in a ledger.
One of the most curious elements is the concept recently vented by the President of the European Commission to have sanctions against Russia extend to Chinese companies that purchase from Russia, to please President Trump request, while, at the same time, President Trump instead announced negotiations with China that produced results.
The relationship between the European Union and the USA is getting closer and closer to the model of the Delian League.
And this has an impact on also how the European Union will develop its own security establishment.
Democracy at war: pre-empt or repair
SUMMARY:
_ wars preparedness: the WWII example
_ war economies, and war preparedness- outside wars
_ distributing the burden of security
_ recent European Union assessments and research
As you can understand also if you never read other article on this website, I like reading history books.
And, for historical reasons, I read military history books, usually trying to see multiple perspectives on the same set of events.
I started suggesting to read or re-read books such as "March of Folly", "Our own worst enemy", "Pathology of leadership", "Guns of August", etc long ago.
Currently, it is common to see at least the first and last of those titles blended into interviews of European leaders who, powerless, observe the constant war mongering around our continent.
And it is even easier to overlap your own request for strong, resolute actions and "boots on the ground", when you are far away and have not been directly elected by citizens.
As my local contacts and online readers know, since the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine, I always reminded how, in WWII, before Pearl Harbor, USA did everything possible to avoid being considered co-belligerent.
Anyway, why many take that assertion, even after I provide examples and specifically point toward documentation, at face value, few actually know the background of those 1930s-1940s choices.
The USA entered WWI late, but still post-WWI this generated costs and a resurgence of the "we are not Europe" instinct, that we call "isolationism".
If you think about it, USA isolationism is curious, as at the beginning USA was built my immigrants displacing the actual indigenous population.
Anyway, it took while for President Roosevelt to obtain a revision of those isolationist instincts, and obtain a change to the neutrality act (see here).
The status?
"U.S. ships were prohibited from transporting any passengers or articles to belligerents, and U.S. citizens were forbidden from traveling on ships of belligerent nations. In a concession to Roosevelt, a "cash-and-carry" provision that had been devised by his advisor Bernard Baruch was added: the president could permit the sale of materials and supplies to belligerents in Europe as long as the recipients arranged for the transport and paid immediately with cash, with the argument that this would not draw the U.S. into the conflict. Roosevelt believed that cash-and-carry would aid France and Great Britain in the event of a war with Germany, since they were the only countries that controlled the seas and were able to take advantage of the provision. The cash-and-carry clause was set to expire after two years."
The overall mobilization and impacts in WWII are often ignored, but it is worth remembering with a table that compiled from other sources (you can read on Kaggle links to sources and the structure of the dataset):
That "cash-and-carry" was exactly the opposite of what we did in Europe: we provided funding, weapons, and even transportation, to say nothing about our own political leaders frankly distracting resources that would be better allocated to the conflict, as got used to do a routine photo-op visit in Ukraine.
Then came the Cold War, and we kept more or less ready for war for over 50 years.
More or less: while living in Brussels before 2012, a Bulgarian acquaintance told me that their own army expected to have just to resist 7 minutes, waiting for their "big brother from Moscow" to intervene- in line with what Italian newspapers reported being the Italian role on the Eastern border.
NATO's own website contains the joke that any history buff in Europe knows: "Lord Hastings Lionel Ismay was NATO's first Secretary General, a position he was initially reluctant to accept. By the end of his tenure however, Ismay had become the biggest advocate of the organisation he had famously said earlier on in his political career, was created to "keep the Soviet Union out, the Americans in, and the Germans down."
Well, it worked.
The Cold War did not have just a military element: that "keep the Soviet Union out" implied accepting also an alignment within each bloc.
While USSR used tanks in 1956 and 1968, we had less violent methods to ensure alignment, and both sides anyway played a cultural war.
There is a book about the history of how a book "Il Gattopardo" (the leopard) became a movie, and the Italian Communist Party media involvement into that transition- first against the book, then, also upon advice from the Big Brother in Moscow, changing stance.
It is funny to read the excerpts from articles of the time, first against and then supporting.
On a more serious tone, a research that shared few times is the one within the book "Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War (U.S. title The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters)": interesting to see, again, how funding was often not direct but indirect.
After the Berlin Wall went down, there was a new lease of life for NATO, as it became involved in various missions to actually help foster peace around the world, and de facto in few conflicts outside the original scope (Europe).
Courtesy of the ability to operate jointly, developed through decades of joint exercises, work on compatible equipment and, of course, a significant exchange between our USA ally and European countries (personally: before President Erdogan's change of approach, frankly supported also Turkey membership within the European Union).
Yes, NATO did expand, integrating most of former-COMECON countries.
My point is: if you want to help somebody immediately, provide resources, not lecturing and countless provisioning agreements to negotiate each time, even bilaterally.
Why Russia did non consider us co-belligerent so far? Because there was no reason to open two fronts, while assumed to be able to win nonetheless.
War preparedness was really what the Cold War was about, as pre-empting (including "deterrence") is better than fixing it later.
Anyway, the rift between USA and the other NATO Member States, with continuous and public venting of requests and shifting roles, at a time when the success is not that much secure, generated an opportunity to resume the old buzzing approach that was common all across the Cold War- playing the game of "who is chickening out first" (albeit had its own side-effects: remember the Korean airliner).
Right now, it is more a matter of internal cohesion and capability- and, while the Ukraine and supporters appear divided, in a twisted way are more cohesive and have access to larger capabilities potentially- hence, a faster close that includes a face-saving element could probably be more of interest for Russia, which is therefore tempted to test the waters of the opponents coalition cohesion, by rattling the cage of the war and force into a negotiated agreement before the difference in capabilities can play a role.
In his first term, as wrote in the past, President Trump was elected, but had actually not his own team of loyalists that has now- hence, in many changes that announced back then, talk did not follow action.
In his second term, instead many of the announces turned into reality- including a redesign of NATO into something that, as wrote repeatedly, increasingly sounds like Athen's Delian League.
And it is curious to hear how often the President of the European Commission echoes, also on defense, compliance with the USA President most unusual requests.
As for the distribution of burden on the cost of security- basically, both on the economic and technology side, Europe paid a price by losing technological and economic independence.
This is even more evident now, as, with all the promises done as part of the trade tariffs negotiation, the European Commission leader opened the Pandora's box of decision-making.
While our European leaders in speeches such as those linked above like to announce what we will do to improve and expand European Union's geopolitical role, as if the world were just to sit down, eat popcorn, and watch us while we unfold and implement our plans, unfortunately this routine approach does not work anymore.
Luckily, there are others thinking as if they were in a competitive and dynamic environment, and trying to do something about it.
As an example, the European Parliament think tank shared recently a couple of documents more useful that the usual declarations useful to get titles in newspapers.
As an example, within Building a common market for European defence - Briefing 22-09-2025, there was this chart:
The "Fragmented national demand" is certainly a key weakness that we need to overcome- but this would require also developing something more than a "maquilladora" industry for what has been developed elsewhere.
As I shared also within a previous article (in March 2025: ReArmEU as a first step of a long journey), we need to develop a complete supply chain.
Something that you cannot do in a couple of years, moreover if, at the same time, you tie your own hands behind your back by committing to:
_ expand buying from external sources
_ promise to avoid local preference rules.
The latter are, actually, what most other countries do- just to avoid what we saw during the Balkan Wars in the 1990s, and then resulted in creating the Galileo satellite system.
So, there is another paper from the same source worth reading, within this context: Understanding the EU trade defence toolbox - Briefing 16-09-2025
And after two sections discussing current and recent events, time to switch to the preparation of the future.
Keeping the balance between components
SUMMARY:
_ a sounder foundation for European democracy
_ democracy in a data-centric society
_ shifting from description to scenarios
_ making a data-centric democracy work globally.
The point of the previous two sections was again: what is democracy within the European Union?
As I shared above, we do not fit the "separation of powers" completely- as the European Commission, which is roughly the executive power, also has limited impacts from the European Parliament actions- and, actually, the European Commission recently stretched so much and so often its own mandate, that recently even from the German Government there was some dissent,
On 2025-09-01, Reuters reported that "Germany dismisses remarks by EU's von der Leyen on troops for Ukraine".
Specifically:
"Germany's defence minister on Monday harshly dismissed as premature remarks by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen on plans to send European troops to Ukraine, saying she lacked the mandate to discuss the matter.
Von der Leyen told the Financial Times in an interview published on Sunday that Europe is drawing up "pretty precise plans" for a multinational troop deployment to Ukraine as part of post-conflict security guarantees that will have the backing of U.S. capabilities."
So, we are back to Montesquieu and Tocqueville: separation of powers.
Before turning the President of the European Commission into the President of the European Union, we need to rebuild boundaries and roles.
So that we can have responsibility and accountability properly distributed across the various institutions- and make clear both inside and outside the European Union when we have somebody talking, or when we have somebody with a mandate talking.
Otherwise, the ego of a single leader could undermine decades of credibility of the European Union as a whole, or, even worse, to avoid contradicting the leader, we end up into countless half-baked initiatives whose context, capabilities, risks, impacts have not been properly vetted.
As I wrote above, better to pre-empt than to repair.
After the curious "negotiation" directly between the President of the European Commission and President Trump of the trade tariffs, some newspapers published articles that were quite curious: talking about the legal enforcement of those agreements, i.e. as if the President of the European Commission had had a mandate to negotiate but, when the results were not acceptable, allowed plausible deniability.
Well, unfortunately, the shortcut created a situation that has to be solved, but simply sidelining the results of a negotiation with a negotiator that supposedly had a mandate undermines the possibility of future negotiations.
Then, there were adjustments in communication to reply to all the critics: and all this only produced more confusion.
In data-centric times, we will have large volumes of continuously streaming and interconnecting data: there is neither time nor need to generate misunderstandings, as each tiny ambiguity might generate hundreds of billions of EUR of impacts on markets.
There is an impact in both defense posture, as shown by recent attacks to virtual infrastructure and providers of platforms that are critical, and perception of reality from society and businesses.
We need a new definition of resilience, and also to shift from "descriptions" to "scenarios".
Example:
Compare with a recent document on the potential impacts of AI on the human rights side ("Artificial intelligence (AI) and human rights: Using AI as a weapon of repression and its impact on human rights" of May 2024)- is an interesting reading.
Human rights in the future, as a component of democracy, will have to be more extensive: to cover also the access to opportunities.
The digital divide of the 1990s and 2000s was nothing, if compared with the potential digital divide in the 2030s and 2040s between those who will have access, and those that will have to ask others for access.
As I wrote in that post on Linkedin, it is a matter of enabling factors, which should be included into any modern scenario design for rights and democracy.
We still need to shift from description to scenarios- which would imply, again, understanding and knowledge of capabilities, risks, impacts.
Recently, there was the anniversary of the report on competitiveness that the President of the European Commission assigned to Mario Draghi, and that was presented in September 2024.
You can access the material here.
Again, interesting to read and hear the different speeches- at the original presentation in September 2024, as well as in different celebration events in September 2025.
Collecting references across the documents, 2024 and 2025, would like to share some quotes, as an incentive to go and read the original documents.
About what is at stake:
"The European Union exists to ensure that Europe's fundamental values are always upheld: democracy, freedom, peace, equity and prosperity in a sustainable environment.
If Europe cannot any longer deliver these values for its people, it will have lost its reason for being.
A key question that has arisen in the last few days is how to ?nance the massive investments that transforming Europe's economy will entail.
Europe has set itself a series of ambitious objectives that have been endorsed by EU institutions and the Member States.
We have enshrined becoming carbon-neutral by 2050 in EU law.
We have committed to raise public spending on innovation to 3% of GDP a year.
Member States that are part of NATO are committed to invest at least 2% of GDP on defence per year.
Over the past months, this House and the EU leaders have discussed and agreed on the urgent, immediate and medium-term defence needs for Europe.
And they have also set out targets for upgrading our digital infrastructure as part of the Digital Decade.
The report contains a bottom-up analysis by Commission sta? of the investment needs to carry out these objectives. And they reach the conclusion that EUR 750-800 billion in additional investment will be required each year.
Analysis by the European Central Bank arrives at similar figures.
However, it is a massive volume of investment. And we calculate that, to marshal investment on this scale, the share of investment in GDP would have to rise to levels not seen in Europe since the 1960s and 70s. The e?ort would be more than double that of Marshall Plan."
As I wrote in a previous section, already the Recovery and Resilience Facility showed some issue in our collective ability to use all the resources available: we need to build capabilities, not just drop helicopter money.
About the current status:
"These defence commitments, however, add to already vast financing needs. The ECB now puts annual investment requirements for 2025-31 at nearly EUR 1,200 billion, up from EUR 800 billion a year ago. The public share has almost doubled, from 24% to 43%- an extra EUR 510 billion a year, as defence is mainly publicly funded."
Again, key issue: still consider what is needed, but not
a) the timeframe needed
b) that if we shift our prorities to implement, our current dependency-links will react to the potential loss of market
c) too much Frankenstein approach- i.e. mimicking what others did
E.g. the DARPA approach and concept had its time and its raison d'être in different times, but currently innovation requires yes "layers" of infrastructure (human, physical, etc), but a different approach.
As an example, the concept that negotiation could lower USA LNG gas costs:
"Europe is already the world's largest buyer of US LNG, and has committed to purchase up to $750 billion in US energy products.
Whatever the conditions of that deal, it should be treated as a chance to reorganize how we purchase gas.
Since March, LNG landed in Europe has cost 60 - 90% more than the same gas would cost in the US - even after accounting for logistics and regasification.
Collective EU purchasing, as first proposed by the Commission after Russia's invasion, could certainly narrow this gap by strengthening our bargaining power, reducing intermediaries' margins and shielding us from volatile spot markets."
Contradictory to the approach adopted by the Commission in the new budget proposed, that identifies state-level: "Europe does have coordination tools, such as Important Projects of Common European Interest (IPCEIs), which can focus support and reduce these spillovers. Yet in 2023, EU countries spent nearly EUR 190 billion on state aid- five times more than has been allocated to IPCEIs since 2018.
Used strategically, IPCEIs could help Europe achieve scale in sectors like innovative nuclear technologies (such as small modular reactors) or in the automotive supply chain for affordable zero- and low-emission vehicles. The Commission is taking measures to make such projects more attractive and accessible.
But the IPCEI model is still essentially national in design and funding. That creates an inherent ceiling compared to our competitors.
Take Europe's semiconductor IPCEI approved in 2023. It mobilises EUR 8 billion of public funding, spread across 14 member states, 68 projects and 56 companies. The overarching target-reaching a 20% global share of semiconductor manufacturing by 2030- is one the European Court of Auditors already calls "very unlikely.""
Also:
"It works in two ways.
First, with total public procurement equal to 14% of EU GDP, directing even a small share to European industries would create stable demand for innovation and strengthen strategic sectors. Second, in industries where scale is decisive, harmonised rules can drive standardisation and sustain long, capital-intensive investment cycles."
Contradicts key elements of USA demands (removing preference clauses), something that from the current negotiation rounds, where we accepted everything, and then, upon further requests, accepted even more, does not bode well.
We live in a competitive environment where we, the European Union, are actually since January 2025 routinely limiting our option in order to obtain a positive feed-back- only to get more demands (and not just from President Trump).
This is the full version of the post linked above, and includes also the original post in French that I replied to:
There are a couple of risks to consider:
_ all the above implies that a data-driven democracy, to work, will need to follow a new paradigm going beyond our current concept of jurisdiction- it is global
_ WTO and ITU or whatever will be created (we are good at creating new quangos and supranational agencies), could turn into another Mutual Agreement on Investment.
Or: a private organization of market actors that will ask a blank cheque from Parliaments worldwide to such a private entity, that would then have the power to enforce compliance to whatever the private organization will decide without political interference, including by assigning penalties to countries and businesses.
Conclusions and next steps
I hope that the sections above raised more doubts than expected- and that inspired few ideas.
If anything, by contrast.
The main aim of this article was to show key weaknesses of our separation of powers within a data-centric society and continuous media cycle.
This article on purpose was blending different dimensions, but focused on bringing business and technology within the political and social domain.
We cannot keep talking of democratization of technology, notably AI, if then we forget that this implies democratization, or at least converting into a "common", the infrastructure and compute power needed to make that sustainable.
It would be delusional to assume that a single central point would be able to steer the evolution: we need something akin to Portugal's one thousand flowers revolution that generated a transition from Salazar to a democracy.
As within the Churchill quote above- imperfect, but still better than the alternatives.
The alternatives? Having a routine of incumbents that, through mutual agreement with few others, as OpenAI did with both Nvidia and Oracle, will try to generate monopolies.
And, by consequence, will have the power to decide what is legitimate political discourse, what are the news worth reporting, and when to give access to specific segments of the population that will work on a budget.
Adopting also practices that in other domains would be called a Ponzi Scheme: if company A invests in company B with the proviso that company B uses the newly raised capital to buy products and services of company A, frankly this is as close as it gets to creative accounting via stock market manipulation.
We still use XIX and even XVIII constructs (corporations, licenses, copyright) to deal with a XXI century context that is completely different.
If you license for a "penalty" of little more than a dozen USD bln to a company the right to leverage on all the aggregated human material available, you are actually closing the market- unless you ask then them to share the generated "raw material"- not the final model, but the resource-intensive result of converting that human material into something that can be usable by models.
To build a level playing field, such apparently extreme reforms would be needed- as while on Linkedin, on that comment above referenced energy infrastructure and compute power, the obvious differentiating (and market-closing) elements, it is also the something more than becomes relevant.
These are just opening considerations on how to resurrect, expand, and evolve our European Union democracy in the XXI century.
Not looking just a XIX or early XX century solutions based on electoral systems, tinkering with organizational structures, and the like, but looking, with open eyes, to the actual landscape we live in, and its potential evolution.
Obviously, converting even part of it into reality would require getting used to the idea that "experts" will need to be involved in designing the overall architecture.
Anyway, in my view, the first step should really be an ex-post analysis of how our European Union institutions evolved since the end of the Cold War, and which weaknesses showed.
As I said earlier this week to others: the first and most difficult step in change, and notably in post-M&A integration (what would be a "real" European Union) is accepting where you really are, not where you assume or perceive to be.
In the next article will discuss my birthplace, Turin, following recent strings of announces, and will share how the lack of the understanding of the difference between perception and assessment of reality is having a significant impact, in my observation since 2012.
For now, stay tuned!